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Spillovers from foreign firms through worker mobility: 
An empirical investigation
1 Introduction
Whereas early attitudes of host countries towards inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) were rather sceptical this has changed notably over the last two or three decades.  As
a matter of fact, since the 1980s many countries have started to actively liberalise
regulations on FDI.  For example, a recent UN World Investment Report (UN 1999) shows
that of 145 regulatory changes made by 60 countries, 94 percent created more favourable
conditions for FDI.  Many host countries are now actively encouraging the inflow of FDI
by providing generous investment and/or tax incentives.  While the expected potential
benefits include employment creation, capital formation and export promotion, one of the
most frequently given reason to attract FDI is the prospect of acquiring new technology
which may spill over to the host country and allow host country firms to improve their
performance.  
More specifically, multinational companies are expected to have access to some sort
of firm specific asset, manifesting itself as a superior knowledge base, production
technology, or marketing and management technique (Markusen, 1995, Caves, 1996).  By
inviting multinationals into the country, host country governments expect that at least some
of this firm specific asset will be transferred to domestic firms, thus enabling such firms to
improve their performance in terms of productivity, skills, or export performance.  This
knowledge transfer can be either voluntary through technology transfer arrangements or
involuntary through knowledge spillovers.  2
A large literature has developed over the last two decades or so concerning itself
with such knowledge, or productivity spillovers.
1  Such spillovers are assumed to occur
through three main channels.  First, there are “demonstration effects”, i.e., domestic firms
learn through imitation from multinationals.  Second, there is a “competition effect” where
domestic firms face competition from more productive multinationals and, therefore, have
to improve their own performance in order to be able to compete successfully.  Third,
spillovers may occur through movement of labour, whereby workers trained by or working
in multinationals may decide to leave and join an existing or open up a new domestic firm,
taking with them some or all of the firm specific knowledge of the multinational.  
Many empirical studies have set out to measure the magnitude of such productivity
spillovers for both developing and developed countries (e.g., Haddad and Harrison, 1993;
Kokko, 1994; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Girma et al., 2001; Barrios and Strobl, 2002)
although these studies treat the mechanism by which the spillovers are supposed to occur as
a “black box”.  As such they usually regress total factor or labour productivity of domestic
firms on a number of covariates, including a measure of the extent of multinational
presence in an industry.  A positive and statistically significant coefficient on that variable
is then interpreted to indicate the existence of positive productivity spillovers.  
Perhaps the most important reason for the lack of studies on disentangling the
channels through which spillovers work is the unavailability of detailed micro level data to
do so.  In this paper, we present a first attempt at measuring the third channel, namely the
movement of workers from foreign to domestic firms.  While this channel has been
analysed in the recent theoretical literature (Fosfuri et al., 2001, Glass and Saggi, 2002), our
                                                          
1 See Görg and Greenaway (2002) and Blomström and Kokko (1998) for concise reviews of that literature.
Görg and Strobl (2001) look critically at the econometric specifications of the spillovers studies.  3
paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to present a detailed analysis at the
empirical level.  
We have detailed firm level data for a sample of manufacturing firms in Ghana
which allow us to tackle this issue.  For our purposes we use information on the
entrepreneur, i.e., owner or chairman of the firm.  Specifically, we have data available on
whether or not the entrepreneur worked for a foreign multinational before setting up his
own firm and we can determine whether this experience was gained in the same or in other
industries.  Furthermore, the data show whether or not he received training by a
multinational firm at any point during the sample period.  Using these data, we investigate
whether firms which have entrepreneurs with foreign training and/or experience have a
productivity advantage compared to other firms.
2
Our econometric evidence indeed shows that firms whose entrepreneur worked in
multinationals in the same industry are more productive than domestic firms.  No such
evidence is found for firms run by entrepreneurs who worked for multinationals in other
industries.  This may suggest that some of the multinationals’ knowledge is industry
specific and cannot be transferred to firms in other industries.  Also, explicit training
received by multinationals does not appear to affect the firm’s performance.  We discuss
these results in more detail in the remainder of the paper, which is structured as follows.
Section 2 briefly discusses the argument why we may expect spillovers through movements
of workers.  Section 3 presents the dataset while Section 4 contains the results of the
econometric estimations.  Section 5 summarises our findings and concludes.  
                                                          
2 Note that we treat the decision of the entrepreneur to move from a foreign to a domestic firm as exogenous.
We do not concern ourselves with this decision of the entrepreneur.  The related literature argues that
employees may decide to become entrepreneurs if the expected earnings are higher than the expected wage if
remaining in employment.  See, for example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989).4
2 Spillovers through worker mobility
Spillovers can arise when workers receive training or accumulate experience
working for multinationals, and then move to domestic firms or set up their own enterprise.
When moving, they will take with them some of the knowledge they have acquired in the
multinational which can be usefully employed by the domestic firm and help improve its
performance.  This channel for spillovers has recently been theoretically investigated by
Fosfuri et al. (2001) who look at the conditions under which such spillovers occur.
Moreover, Glass and Saggi (2002) also provide a formal representation of the movement of
trained workers from multinationals to domestic firms as a channel for spillovers.  
Empirical work in this area is, however, scarce.  There is some evidence that
multinationals are important providers of training activities in developing countries (ILO,
1981; Lindsey, 1986).  Also, some studies found that in a comparison of domestic firms and
multinationals, the latter provide more training than the former.  Gershenberg (1987)
provides evidence to that extent from a survey of 72 managers in manufacturing firms in
Kenya.
3  He also finds some evidence for movements of managers from multinationals to
domestic firms.
4  Djankov and Hoekman (1999) analyse enterprise level panel data for the
Czech Republic.  In their summary statistics they show that multinationals provide higher
levels of training than domestic firms.  Sousa (2001) appears to provide the most
comprehensive analysis of training activities of multinationals.  Using detailed data on
workplaces in the UK he finds that multinationals are more likely to provide training, and
                                                          
3  This finding is only true in a comparison of multinationals and purely domestic private firms.
Multinationals do not appear to provide more training than joint ventures or publicly owned Kenyan
companies.  5
also provide higher intensities of training than domestic firms, controlling for a number of
workplace and sector specific characteristics.  Using a matched firm and worker level
dataset for Ghanaian manufacturing firms, Görg, Strobl and Walsh (2002) find that workers
who work for and receive training in foreign firms experience more rapid wage growth than
workers being trained in domestic firms.  This is consistent with their theoretical model
which shows that training provided by foreign firms is more productivity than that of
domestic firms and, hence, workers trained in foreign firms have steeper wage profiles.  
The aforementioned studies show for a number of countries that the potential for
spillovers through the movement of highly trained and experienced workers from
multinationals to domestic firms exist.  However, there is to the best of our knowledge no
study to date that attempts to determine whether the domestic firms that receive the new
workers actually benefit from spillovers.
5  This is arguably at least partially due to the
unavailability of detailed data at the micro level.  
3 Description of the data
In an ideal world, one would like to have data on the history of all workers in firms
to be able to trace back whether they have had any work experience, or have been trained
by multinational companies before joining the current firm.  Using such data one would
then be able to determine whether employing those workers leads to the firm being more
technology intensive, using better technology and, ultimately, being more efficient and
                                                                                                                                                                                
4 Pack (2001) similarly points out that there is evidence for Taiwan that managers from multinationals leave
to set up their own business. 
5 There are some empirical studies that show that inward FDI increases wages paid by domestic firms (e.g,
Aitken et al, 1996, Girma et al., 2001, Sjöholm and Lipsey, 2001).  These studies may be interpreted as
providing some indirect evidence for spillovers through labour mobility, leading to higher wages in domestic6
productive.  While we do not have such detailed data on all workers in firm, we have data
available on characteristics of the owner/chairman of a firm which allows us to investigate
whether a domestic firm benefits if its entrepreneur came from a foreign firm.  
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Regional Programme for Enterprise
Development (RPED) dataset for Ghanaian manufacturing firms.  The data consist of seven
waves of an annual sample of Ghanaian manufacturing firms in the Food, Textiles and
Garments, Wood, and Metal sectors, covering the years 1991-1997.
6,7  The dataset includes,
amongst other things, data on the level of output, total expenditures on wages, the
replacement value of the capital stock, the level of value added, and the level of
employment.  More importantly, the data collection entails an intricate questionnaire on the
background of the owner, or, in the case of a corporation, the chairman of the firm.
8
Specifically, one is able to identify whether the owner/chairman has received any explicit
training by foreign firms in the past, whether their immediate previous experience was
working with a foreign firm within the same industry as the industry of their current firm or
in some other industry, and whether they have had any previous same industry experience
in general.
9  For the purposes here we are interested in investigating whether training and/or
experience in a foreign firm by the owner/chairman affects firm level productivity growth,
and create zero-one type dummy variables to indicate such.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
firms.  Our paper however attempts to provide some direct evidence on spillovers through worker movements.  
6 These sectors together comprise about 70 per cent of total manufacturing employment in Ghana.
7 The initial sample of 200 firms was drawn from the 1987 Ghana Census of Manufacturing Activities,
stratified by size, sector and location.  It should be noted that in the sampling, large firms were oversampled.
When firms closed down over the period they were replaced with firms in the same size, sector and location
category.
8 These data are not collected for foreign owned firms and public enterprises.
9 These questions are re-asked if the firm changes ownership/chairmanship.7
Given that these are our main variables of interest they deserve some more
discussion.  In particular, it is important to point out that this group with foreign working
and/or training experience will consist of any of the following three types:  (1) persons who
worked in a foreign firm immediately prior to their present occupation, (2) persons who
worked for a foreign firm immediately prior to their present occupation and were explicitly
trained by a foreign firm that may be either their immediately prior employer or some other
previous foreign employer, (3) persons that were explicitly trained by a foreign firm but
may have never worked for such, and, (4) persons that were explicitly trained by a foreign
firm and have worked for a foreign firm (possibly although not necessarily the same firm)
although not immediately prior to their current employment as entrepreneur/chairman.
Given that the information on actual employment by a foreign employer only pertains to the
experience immediately prior to becoming owner/chairman of the firm questioned, we are
unable to identify those that were never explicitly trained but may have worked for a
foreign firm, although not immediately prior to becoming the owner/chairman of their
current firm.  At any rate, out of the 204 domestic manufacturing firms included in our
sample, the owners of 13 firms have immediate prior experience working in foreign firms
in the same industry, 9 have immediate prior experience working with foreign firms in a
different industries, and 14 received training provided by foreign firms. 
Finally, the RPED data also includes information on the years of schooling of the
owner/chairman.  We explicitly use this variable to proxy for the level of human capital,
excluding foreign training and experience, of the individual in question.
10
                                                          
10 These are calculated in years.  In some waves one has information on the age at which the individual left
school and what qualification achieved, whereas in others on information on the former is available.  Where
possible we use information on both of these to construct years of schooling.8
Some summary statistics for our data for firms by ownership with and without
foreign experience/training are given in Table 1.  We calculate and compare a number of
measures of firm performance, namely total factor productivity (tfp),
11 output per worker
(q/l), value added per worker (vad/l), output (q), value added (v), capital and material inputs
per worker (k/l, m/l), average wage per employee (w) and total employment (l).  All
variables are expressed in logs.
12  
[Table 1 here]
As can be seen, firms owned or run by those with experience and/or training from
foreign firms display on average greater labour productivity in terms of both measures of
labour productivity, namely output per worker and value added per worker.  These
differences are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.  Also, they are significantly
larger, in terms of output, value added or employment.  Furthermore, these firms are more
intensive in both capital and labour usage.  The summary statistics do not indicate that they
have higher TFP, however.  Also, we find that firms run by owners without such experience
or training pay higher wages, although this difference is only statistically significant at the
10 per cent level. 
These figures may give some preliminary evidence supportive of the idea that there
are spillovers from the movement of managers from multinationals to domestic firms, as
firms run by owners who had such experience seem to have higher productivity, at least in
terms of labour productivity.  These figures are, of course, averages over fairly
heterogeneous firms and the summary statistics may be confounding the effects of different
sector, firm or owner characteristics.  We turn therefore to an econometric analysis in order
                                                          
11 See the appendix for a description of how TFP was calculated.  
12 Nominal values are deflated using sectoral output price deflators.  9
to disentangle the effect of foreign experience/training from other variables impacting on
firm productivity.  
4 Econometric Analysis
In order to test more properly for the existence of spillovers through worker
mobility we estimate a set of different specifications of production functions in order to
determine the effect of entrepreneurs’ characteristics on firm level productivity.  The basic
specification of the empirical models is as follows
dyit = β 0 + β 1yit-1 + β 2FTit + β 3FEij + β 4FEis + β 5 COit + β 6 CFit + β 5Dj + β 6Tt + eit
(1)
where dy is the growth rate (in log differences) of the productivity measure y for
firm i, yit-1 is the lagged log level of y.  CO is a vector including characteristics of the
owner, namely, years of schooling and a dummy equal to one if the owner had any
experience in the industry prior to founding or acquiring the current firm.  CF is a vector of
firm characteristics depending on the specification of the productivity measure.  D and T
are full sets of sector and time dummy variables respectively and eit is the remaining white
noise error term. 
The other three variables are dummy variables included to capture any spillovers
from work experience or training received by multinationals.  FTi is equal to one if the
owner received training by a multinational.  FEij is a dummy equal to one if the owner of
the firm had gained experience working for a multinational within the same industry j prior10
to starting in the present firm, while FEis is equal to one if previous experience was gained
in a multinational in a different industry s ≠  j.  If all or part of the knowledge accumulated
by workers is industry specific we would expect that experience gained in multinationals in
the same industry would allow the entrepreneur to improve the performance of the
domestic firm, while this effect would be less if experience were gained outside the
industry.
We estimate a number of specifications of the productivity equation.  Firstly, we use
labour productivity, measured as either output per worker or value added per worker.
While this measure has been commonly used in the literature on spillovers from foreign
direct investment (e.g., Kokko, 1994; Barrios and Strobl, 2002) it captures only one aspect
of productivity improvements.  Spillovers may not only affect labour productivity but may
also change the input mix and capital utilisation, therefore impacting on total factor
productivity (TFP).  Hence, we include three specifications estimating the determinants of
TFP, two of which are based on estimating augmented production functions (as, for
example, in Aitken and Harrison, 1999 and Haddad and Harrison, 1993) where the
variables FTi, FEij and FEis are included in the production function and are assumed to
increase output or value added.  The third specification is based on the estimate of TFP as
the dependent variable, as described in the appendix. 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating these different specifications of equation
(1).  The labour productivity and augmented production function estimations are based on
first-differenced production functions.  This allows us to purge any firm specific fixed
effects in levels which may bias the result in levels if not properly dealt with.  The
economic justification for this approach is that we are not interested in whether firms run11
by owners with foreign training or experience have higher levels of productivity per se, but
whether they have higher productivity growth.  In other words, we do not concern ourselves
with looking at the intercept shift due to spillovers, but we are interested in changes in the
slope of the productivity function.  Hence, we also look at TFP growth as dependent
variable in column (5).  Note that in the first set of estimations in Table 2 we do not control
for any characteristics of the owner apart from the foreign training and experience
variables.  
[Table 2 here]
We find that experience in foreign firms in the same industry has a consistently
positive effect on firm level productivity in all specifications.  However, the coefficients on
this variable are statistically insignificant in all cases.  There is also no statistically
significant evidence that foreign training received by the owner improves productivity.
However, we find that the results obtained for experience accumulated in multinationals
operating in a different industry are quite different.  The coefficients on the dummy
variable are negative for all productivity measures and statistically significant in three out
of five cases.  We will return to a possible explanation for this results below.  
Before interpreting the results we need to address a number of possible caveats.  A
first obvious criticism to address at these first results is that foreign firms may be more
likely to hire or provide training to more skilled workers as these workers already have
better and more human capital.  In that case, our foreign experience / training variables
would be only measuring that the entrepreneur is of higher ability.  In other words, while
foreign experience or training may seem to increase productivity, this may only be due to
the owners being better educated and/or more able a priori.  Secondly, one may argue that12
the foreign experience variable in this first specification only picks up the effect of
experience gained in the industry per se but does not represent an effect particular to
experience gained in foreign firms.  Thirdly, it may be the case that highly productive firms
attract entrepreneurs that have gained experience in multinationals as they provide an
attractive environment in which to work for the new entrepreneur.  In that case the
spillovers dummies would, of course, be endogenous.  
Let us focus on the first two issues first.  In order to take these points into account
we re-estimated equation (1) now including two additional measures of the owner’s ability.
These are years of schooling of the entrepreneur and a dummy equal to one if he/she has
any previous experience in the same industry.  We also interact the schooling variable with
the three foreign experience / training variables in order to capture the effect that more
skilled employees may benefit differently from foreign experience / training than less
skilled individuals.  
The results of these estimations are reported in Table 3.  The years of schooling
variable shows consistently positive coefficients (statistically significant in two cases)
which indeed suggests that more able individuals run more productive firms.  Specifically,
for columns (2) and (4) the results suggest that each additional year of schooling adds
around 0.03 percentage points to productivity growth.  Previous experience in the industry
is in most cases negative but always statistically insignificant, however.  
The inclusion of these two variables plus the interaction terms leads to some
interesting changes in the significance of the spillovers variables.  For within industry
experience we now find a consistently positive and statistically significant coefficient in all
cases, suggesting that owners who gained experience in multinationals in the same industry13
indeed run more productive firms.  This, thus, provides evidence supportive of the idea that
there are spillovers through worker movements, where the domestic entrepreneurs bring
with them knowledge accumulated in the multinationals which can be usefully applied in
the domestic firm.  The consistently negative coefficient on the interaction term also
suggests that the least skilled entrepreneurs can gain more from having experience in
multinationals and thus that prior human capital and training received by foreign firms are
not necessarily complements.  Their individual human capital may benefit most from
additional learning in multinationals compared to well educated domestic entrepreneurs
who may gain only little additional knowledge.  
There is also still evidence that gaining experience in multinationals outside the own
industry has a negative effect on productivity.  Again there is, however, evidence that this
effect is lower the more skilled the entrepreneur.  The coefficients on training provided by
multinationals are still statistically insignificant in all cases, suggesting that training does
not appear to be an important channel for spillovers.  
[Table 3 here]
Of course, inferring causality from these results may still be difficult if, as pointed
out above, our results pick up the fact that highly productive domestic plants attract
entrepreneurs who gained experience in foreign firms.  This criticism would not apply if
these domestic firms were established by the owners, of course, and did not have a history
of existence before the owner joined.  Fortunately, from our dataset we can determine
whether an owner established a firm himself and whether the business has been run by the
owners family.  Focusing on these two groups of firms should allow us to avoid the
possible bias arising from productive firms attracting experienced high ability owners.  14
Table 4, therefore, presents results of estimating the production functions using data
only for firms if they were founded by the current owner or if they were run by the owners
family before he took over ownership.  Reassuringly, the results remain very similar to the
results presented in Table 3 in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.  
[Table 4 here]
Taken together, these results suggest that domestic firms which are run by
entrepreneurs who gained experience working for multinationals in the same industry
before running their own firms, show higher productivity growth than other firms.  This
may be interpreted as a sign that the entrepreneurs bring with them some of the knowledge
accumulated in the multinational which can be usefully employed in the new domestic firm.
Our finding that there is a negative effect if the entrepreneur gained his experience in
multinationals in a different industry suggests that the knowledge obtained in
multinationals is largely industry specific and can therefore not be easily transferred to
businesses in different industries.  It appears that, at least in the shortrun, these
entrepreneurs run firms less productive than the average domestic firms perhaps due to
their having to spend time building up or improving their industry specific knowledge
and/or because the skills acquired in foreign firms may be even more industry specific than
those acquired in domestic firms.  
While these results concerning experience gained in foreign firms provide some
evidence to the suggestion that there are spillovers from worker mobility, there is no
evidence to suggest that firms also benefit if their owners receive training in multinationals.
As the training variable only captures explicit training provided by multinationals it may,
however, be the case that we are thus not able to measure adequately other types of more15
informal acquisitions of human capital and/or that explicit training only constitutes a small
proportion of total human capital acquired in a foreign owned firm.  
5 Conclusions
While there has been a large empirical literature on productivity spillovers from
foreign to domestic firms this literature treats the channels through which these spillover
effects work as a black box.  Some theoretical work has recently stressed the importance of
movement of workers from foreign to domestic firms as a channel for spillovers.  To the
best of our knowledge, however, there is to date no empirical study which investigates this
issue in detail.  We attempt to fill this gap in the literature with this paper.  
While our results focus only on one possible mechanism for spillovers through
worker movements, namely, the movement of the owner/chairman of the firm, they suggest
that firms which are run by owners that worked for multinationals in the same industry
immediately prior to opening up their own firm have higher productivity growth than other
firms.  This implies that these entrepreneurs bring with them some of the knowledge
accumulated in the multinational which can be usefully employed in the new domestic firm.
We do not find any positive effects on firm performance if the owner had experience in
multinationals in other industries, or received training by multinationals.  
These results suggest that domestic firms can benefit from multinationals operating
in the same industry.  Thus, our findings provide a counterbalance to Kugler (2000) who
argues and provides evidence for Colombia that domestic firms only benefit from inter-
industry but not from intra-industry spillovers from multinationals.  At least in the case of
spillovers from worker movements domestic firms are likely to benefit more from16
multinationals in the same industry as at least some of the knowledge transferred is likely to
be industry specific.  17
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Appendix: TFP Calculation
Using log values, we write the production function as  ) , , , ( it it it it it TFP m k l f y ≡ ,
where y is output and there are three factors of production, labour (l), materials or cost of
goods sold (m) and capital stock (k).  For estimation purposes we employ a first-order
Taylor approximation and write the production function as
it it m it k it s it TFP m k l y + + + + = β β β β 0  (A1)
TFP is assumed to follow the following AR(1) process:
it i t it it v f D TFP TFP + + + = − δ ρ 1 (A2)
where D is a common year-specific shock, f is a time-invariant firm specific effect
and v a random error term.  Note that we do not simply model productivity as a fixed effect,
as that would imply that TFP differences are fixed, and there is no role for technology
diffusion (convergence).
Recently the fundamental assumption of pooling individual times series data has
been questioned.  Pesaran and Smith (1995) demonstrate that standard GMM estimators of
dynamic panel models lead to invalid inference if the response parameters are characterised
by heterogeneity.  They argue that one is better off averaging parameters from individual
time series regressions.  This is not feasible here since the individual firm’s time series data
is not of adequate length.  However, we take some comfort from a recent comparative study
by Baltagi and Griffin (1997) which concludes that efficiency gains from pooling are likely
to more than offset the biases due to individual heterogeneity.  Baltagi and Griffin (1997)
especially point out the desirable properties of  the GLS-AR(1) estimator, and we use this
estimator to obtain estimates of the factor elasticities, and derive TFP as a residual term. 20
Table 1: 











difference statistically significant at + 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2: 
Basic regression results, year-on-year growth rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dln(q/l) dln(vad/l) dln(q) dln(vad) dln(tfp)
yt-1 -0.034 -0.233 -0.019 -0.147 -0.628
(0.011)** (0.033)** (0.009)* (0.026)** (0.060)**
FTi -0.064 -0.120 -0.055 -0.076 0.008
(0.124) (0.288) (0.125) (0.293) (0.116)
FEij 0.085 0.187 0.077 0.145 0.065
(0.072) (0.238) (0.070) (0.223) (0.075)
FEis -0.015 -0.650 -0.031 -0.736 -0.473





dln(l) -0.120 -0.352 0.113 0.384







Constant -0.045 2.113 -0.109 1.969 0.003
(0.144) (0.429)** (0.153) (0.453)** (0.078)
Observations 580 585 580 585 580
R-squared 0.89 0.30 0.89 0.28 0.40
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ statistically significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Regressions include sectoral and time dummies21
Table 3: 
Alternative regression results including owner’s ability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dln(q/l) dln(vad/l) dln(q) dln(vad) dln(tfp)
yt-1 -0.045 -0.284 -0.026 -0.181 -0.648
(0.013)** (0.036)** (0.010)** (0.029)** (0.060)**
FTi 0.473 1.362 0.353 0.518 0.502
(0.862) (1.097) (0.868) (1.125) (0.790)
FEij 0.651 3.091 0.510 2.335 0.591
(0.252)** (0.694)** (0.247)* (0.688)** (0.207)**
FEis -0.125 -0.473 -0.171 -0.783 -0.644
(0.162) (0.390) (0.162) (0.417)+ (0.157)**
FTi * si -0.048 -0.137 -0.037 -0.058 -0.044
(0.083) (0.088) (0.083) (0.090) (0.075)
FEij * si -0.060 -0.302 -0.046 -0.224 -0.056
(0.027)* (0.079)** (0.026)+ (0.079)** (0.023)*
FEis * si 0.019 -0.023 0.023 0.008 0.029
(0.017) (0.039) (0.017) (0.041) (0.014)*
si 0.004 0.032 0.003 0.027 0.006
(0.004) (0.010)** (0.004) (0.010)** (0.004)
Eij -0.035 -0.100 -0.031 -0.095 -0.041





dln(l) -0.123 -0.361 0.111 0.362







Constant 0.424 1.854 0.332 1.957 -0.009
(0.153)** (0.457)** (0.152)* (0.510)** (0.080)
Observations 569 574 569 574 569
R-squared 0.89 0.32 0.89 0.29 0.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ statistically significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Regressions include sectoral and time dummies22
Table 4: 
Alternative regression results for firms established by owner or family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dln(q/l) dln(vad/l) dln(q) dln(vad) dln(tfp)
yt-1 -0.042 -0.271 -0.026 -0.175 -0.650
(0.013)** (0.035)** (0.010)** (0.028)** (0.061)**
FTi 0.468 1.275 0.351 0.463 0.411
(0.850) (1.092) (0.855) (1.119) (0.792)
FEij 0.611 3.004 0.493 2.291 0.623
(0.254)* (0.690)** (0.251)+ (0.683)** (0.207)**
FEis -0.099 -0.450 -0.140 -0.711 -0.566
(0.140) (0.384) (0.142) (0.410)+ (0.159)**
FTi * si -0.048 -0.128 -0.037 -0.053 -0.036
(0.081) (0.087) (0.082) (0.089) (0.076)
FEij * si -0.056 -0.294 -0.044 -0.221 -0.059
(0.026)* (0.078)** (0.026)+ (0.077)** (0.023)**
FEis * si 0.020 -0.014 0.024 0.013 0.024
(0.015) (0.038) (0.016) (0.041) (0.015)
si 0.005 0.034 0.004 0.029 0.007
(0.004) (0.011)** (0.004) (0.010)** (0.004)+
Eij -0.022 -0.067 -0.019 -0.058 -0.015





dln(l) -0.157 -0.441 0.088 0.297







Constant 0.469 2.177 0.421 2.066 0.017
(0.186)* (0.498)** (0.184)* (0.534)** (0.162)
Observations 550 554 550 554 550
R-squared 0.89 0.33 0.89 0.29 0.42